Five-Page Penalty for Delay of Book

Sorry to have spent so long on the subject of terrorism. It is far afield from hormesis and the positive applications of nuclear energy, but it is a false argument so often used by anti-nuclear people, and it is never refuted - or even questioned - in the media. We might note that our overseas neighbors know this "threat of terrorism" malarkey is total rot - but what do they care what we think? If it goes on long enough, they will be able to sell high-energy content products to us... while we lap up good old safe solar energy in our cotton fields. Suffice it to say that the "terrorists with the plutonium" excuse for stopping a major reprocessing facility is as thin as a dime - and worth far less.

There Has Just Got To Be A Better Way

Anyone who has the lightest familiarity with nuclear power knows that it is impossible to steal fuel from an operating reactor. Even assuming a terrorist knew how to shut it down, there is still the problem of very high level radiation within the reactor core that would be fatal in a matter of minutes for anyone who attempted to break in. (Our brave terrorist - pardon the oxymoron - would find this a very unpleasant way to enter paradise.)

The same goes for hijacking the spent-fuel truck or train on the way to the reprocessing plant. After storage for at least five years at the power plant site, the "spent" fuel is still highly radioactive and thermally quite hot. Hijacking 44,000-pound fuel containers - designed to smash into a concrete wall at 60 mph or fall onto a spike from thirty feet without rupturing - is a bit difficult to do surreptitiously.

This leaves us with raiding the reprocessing plant (bad idea) or stealing the fuel from shipments to the power plant (best bet). Assuming that the militants can make off with a huge truck, monitored as all valuable shipments are with global positioning electronics and probably guarded, and that no one notices this cargo with the huge radioactive symbols all over it, the hijackers must plan ahead to make sure their plutonium reclamation plant is near by. Typically the price tag on such a facility is in the hundreds of millions, or billions of dollars - and, of course, they've got to hide this construction from the prying eyes of swarms of government inspectors looking for something to inspect... or, even more difficult to avoid, the office-supply salesmen in the four surrounding counties.

Assuming the truck is hijacked and taken to the secret $100 million facility, the problems are just starting for our ill-intentioned thieves. Now they must cut up the fuel assemblies and dissolve them in nitric acid. After that, the chemical processes to separate the plutonium from the uranium are devilishly tricky - in part because an almost-certainly fatal criticality accident can occur quite easily when the plutonium is in a liquid form. But let's assume that our "clever" terrorists are successful in refining out the plutonium and have shaped it for a bomb. Two big problems:

The first is obtaining the explosive charges necessary to "implode" a sphere of plutonium in on itself - essentially taking a hollow globe and compressing it down to a golf or tennis-ball-sized solid... well, almost solid. Regular explosive won't work, as the charge must have different characteristics as it "burns" to maintain the shape of the shock wave that is doing the compressing. Then there is the matter of the initiator, or trigger - the device that produces a stream of neutrons to start the reaction inside a one-tenth microsecond envelope when they are needed. This was considered by the Manhattan Project team (approximately 130,000 personnel, including arguably the best physicists and engineers in the world) as one of the most difficult items to design. Polonium 210 and beryllium must be mixed thoroughly - but this must occur within the aforementioned 0.0000001-second time frame. But let's suppose they are able to do all this. Sorry, still no cigar.

For you see, problem two, the plutonium they liberated from the Imperialist Yankee Running Dogs is not suitable for making a decent bomb. Since BWR and PWR reactors "burn" fuel slowly, Pu239 is created not only from the U238, but also from the Pu240 isotope. While not a fissionable isotope (which wouldn't make much difference in small concentrations), it is a spontaneous neutron emitter, which bodes ill for aspiring bomb makers. Even a very small amount of Pu240 is sufficient to throw off the timing of the necessary bomb reaction by starting it before the implosion is complete - causing the bomb to fizzle. Oh, you'll get an explosion of sorts - perhaps sufficient to flatten a city block or two - but not as awful as what you could do with ammonium nitrate and a little fuel oil, a la Oklahoma City. (The 1947 Texas City blast - where 512 were killed - was also a fertilizer explosion, which didn't require any plutonium at all.)

Terrorists are, in my mind, among the most despicable of humankind. But this isn't to say they are stupid. If they want to kill people and spread fear, there are a lot of easier ways to do this, and they know it. Poisoning the water supply, blasting a hole in a dam, setting oil storage facilities afire when the wind is blowing toward a heavily populated area - the list goes on and on. But building a dud bomb from hijacked plutonium isn't one of them.

Where the Terrorists Have Already Won

In 1978, Jimmy Carter reneged on the opening of a reprocessing plant that was nearing completion in Barnwell, South Carolina. This facility was to take "spent" fuel rods from power reactors owned by the utilities, dissolve them in acid, then separate the uranium and plutonium from the contaminants that would "poison" and eventually stop the chain reaction. The highly radioactive progeny of the energy-producing reactions - amounting to some 1% or 2% of the volume - would be disposed of by any one of a number of perfectly safe methods. The fuel portion would then be reformed into uranium or "MOX" pellets for insertion into fuel assemblies.

Hold on. Could one infer from this that these "spent" fuel elements contain in excess of 90% of their intial fuel? Yes, one could. Is this what we plan to bury under Yucca Mountain? Precisely.

Does this make sense to you? It certainly doesn't to the English, French, Japanese, Russians, and others who think we are absolutely nuts for planning to bury unbelievable amounts of readily obtainable energy. But it made sense to the Carter administration, and even though Reagan reversed the decision, there were no corporate takers who were willing to risk their shareholders' money on a project that could be changed by the whim of a government with a history of caving in to the slightest pseudo-environmentalist pressure. And there would certainly be pressure - since, as we "know," all radiation is dangerous, since any gamma ray could cause cancer... even though the odds against it are 30 quadrillion to one.

What was the reason - excuse, really - that the Carter administration used to stop reprocessing? It was the threat of terrorism. Let's consider briefly the problems from the standpoint of terrorists who are planning a heist of plutonium, with which they intend to make a bomb.

The Dirty Bomb's Dirty Little Secret

Anyone who has the slightest familiarity with nuclear power knows that it is impossible to steal fuel from an operating reactor.

Is there a nuclear threat to Western civilization? No question. As long as there are nuclear weapons and Islamic terrorists who would murder thousands of innocents without conscience, such a possibility exists. Actions to prevent this are a subject far afield from hormesis, but one possibility might be to offer a higher-than-market price for plutonium to be blended into MOX, rendering it unusable for weapons, as a fuel for power reactors.

MOX is mixed oxide fuel composed of 7% plutonium mixed with depleted uranium. Currently about 2% of reactor fuel is MOX. A very good discussion of MOX and the use of reactor-grade plutonium in weapons can be found online at the following address: www.nic.com.au/nip42.htm.

The Cornucopia of Nuclear Power

You will remember from chapter 21 that we have two neutrons, on average, emitted whenever a U235 atom undergoes fission - or "splitting." One of these is necessary to fission another atom to keep the chain reaction going. But what happens to all of those second neutrons? Some of them, as mentioned, are absorbed by the structure of the reactor or by the control rods, which slide in and out of the reactor to keep the reaction at - or just very slightly above - the critical point. But others smash into, and are captured by, the plentiful U238 atoms that make up from 95% to 96.5% of the fuel rod contents. When this happens, a truly miraculous thing takes place: This practically worthless material is transformed into one of the most concentrated sources of energy on Earth - or in the universe for that matter - plutonium 239, and element so evil that it was named for the god of the underworld. (Not really, but that's what some would have you believe.) [Plutonium was named in honor of the discovery of the planet Pluto, just as neptunium and uranium were named for Neptune and Uranus.]

This happens in every one of the world's 500 power reactors, plus thousands of research reactors, every day they are in operation. In fact, a sizable fraction (up to about 30%) of electrical energy generated by a power plant comes from this plutonium, which arises as a natural consequence of the uranium fission reaction - without any effort on our part - and supplements the scarce U235 fuel.

Some reactors, however, are designed to intentionally make plutonium. If it is to be used in bombs, it is normally made in a reactor with another modulator - such as the carbon-modulated reactor at Chernobyl. A reactor designed specifically to make only fuel-grade plutonium is called a breeder reactor, since new fuel is "bred" from an almost worthless byproduct of the refining cycle. [Breeder technology seems to be on hold for a couple of reasons: (1) in the prevailing anti-nuclear climate, few entrepreneurs or speculators are willing to make investments in nuclear power for fear of laws that can make their investment instantly worthless; and (2) at the present time there is a glut of plutonium available from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons.]

Are we speculating here on new technology like "fusion" power? Hardly.

The first reactor ever to produce electric power from nuclear energy was a "liquid metal fast breeder reactor" known as the EBR-I. (By the way, liquid metal means that the coolant was not our old friend water, but liquid sodium; fast means that it used "fast neutrons," not the slowed-down, moderated variety.) Designed by physicist Walter Zinn in 1944, his brainchild went critical at 11 am, December 20, 1951 - producing the first steam in history produced by man-made nuclear heat. Like the Manhattan reactor in Chicago and the SLOWPOKE reactor in Canada, EBR-I was not designed to produce electrical power but to prove the concept of fuel breeding (which it did along with its successor, EBR-II). [Declared a national landmark in 1966, the EBR-I is open to the public from mid June to mid September. Located eighteen miles southeast of Arco, Idaho, on Highway 26, visitors must be at least sixteen years old (too much neutron violence?) and U.S. citizens (fear of spies who might steal this technology?).]

The EBR-II had "on the spot reprocessing," which reprocessed 35,000 fuel elements between 1965 and 1969. But the facility was not without problems: the fence around it kept out the coyotes, causing the rabbit population to outbreed the reactor.

Does the ERB-II sound a little familiar? It should since it has another name we used in chapter 21 - the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR).

While many U.S. politicians have never heard of breeder technology, Europeans have. Sadly, "Green" activists there have been successful in shutting them down or keeping them from ever starting up.

The Most Toxic Substance on Earth?

One of the noisiest guns in the anti-nuclear arsenal has been the cultivated fear of plutonium. "The most toxic substance known to man," so the mantra goes - in complete disregard to toxicity studies showing the element to be about as toxic as caffeine and 1/1,000,000,000,000 the toxicity of botulism toxin. Even in the health physics field, however, there has been a great deal of concern over inhaled plutonium, because it is an alpha emitter shooting nuclear cannon balls directly into adjacent lung tissue. If you presume radiation is a major cause of cancer, it is only logical to see chronic exposure from an alpha source within the lungs as extremely dangerous. But just as with radon exposure in mining environments, plutonium may not be nearly as dangerous as earlier believed.

During the urgent atomic bomb development period of 1944-45, some workers were exposed to plutonium fumes and extremely fine dust, which accumulated primarily in lung tissue. Twenty-six of these exposed males were followed with regular examinations every five years starting in 1952. When the initial study of these examinations began in 1973 [Hempelmann, L.H. et al. Manhattan Project plutonium workers. A twenty-seven year follow-up study of selected cases. Health Physics, 25, 461, 1973], one subject had already died of a heart attack. Anti-nuclear scientists, such as John Gofman, predicted shortened life spans from radiation-induced lung cancer. [Gofman, J.W., Radiation and Human Health, Sierra Clue Books, San Francisco, 1981.]

But apparently, someone forgot to tell the workers.

At the time of the 1986-87 examination period, with an average of age of sixty-six years, twenty-two of the twenty-five subjects had refused to die on Gofman's schedule. One had died in an automobile accident, another of a heart attack at age sixty-two, and the third - a pack-a-day-plus smoker - had succumbed to lung cancer in his seventy-second year. (It may be of some interest that this person, identified as Subject #10, was in the lower half of estimated plutonium deposits.)

Because only twenty-six individuals were involved, the study has no statistical significance - which is to say that chance could have been at work selecting certain men who were unusually tolerant to the effects of inhaled plutonium. But the data is also suggestive of a lesser response to plutonium than the LNT dose-response would predict.

Anti-nuclear activists are fond of saying that "a single gamma ray can lead to cancer." Eight of the atomic bomb workers - all living at the end of 1987 - had received a dose of more than 2,000,000,000,000,000 alpha particles, which is the equivalent of 8,000,000,000,000,000 gamma rays (assuming a Q of 4). Not only were the "victims" alive, but they were healthier than their peers who weren't lucky enough to inhale plutonium dust more than forty years earlier.

If this study were the only one indicating a biopositive dose-response from plutonium ingestion, it might be written off as an anomaly. But, quoting from a paper by Voelz and Lawrence [Voelz, G.L. and Lawrence, J.N.P. A forty-two-year medical follow-up of Manhattan Project plutonium workers. Health Physics, Vol. 61, 1991. For more information, you might also refer to Voelz, G.L. et al. Mortality study of Los Alamos workers with higher exposures to plutonium. Epidemiology applied to health physics. Proceedings of the Health Physics Society, Albuquerque, N.M. Report CONF-83010, 318, 1983]:

"Other studies of Pu-exposed workers have not demonstrated excesses of lung cancer. In 224 white male Pu-exposed workers, selected on the basis of each having a 1974 estimated Pu deposition in excess of 370Bq (10 nCi), only one death from lung cancer occurred over at 33-year follow-up period. The SMR for lung cancer based on U.S. rates was 0.2 (95% C.I.=0,1.1)."

Lest you have forgotten the definition, an SMR of 0.2 means that the lung cancer rate for the workers exposed to plutonium was one-fifth that of the general population.

Don't take this as an indication that plutonium is never dangerous when ingested. All the heavy metals are toxic to some degree, and though a relatively benign alpha emitter, it has the potential for being dangerous in large amounts. Several studies noted by Voelz in which beagles were exposed to very high doses produced extremely severe consequences. But hormesis is about the differences in effects of a toxin depending on the dose and/or dose rate. Evidence in these studies clearly suggests that plutonium may be an effective hormetin.

Waste 'n' Time

Uh, oh. I'm afraid I've kind of painted myself into a corner here by minimizing the "problem" of nuclear wastes. If I give it short shrift, it will appear that I'm avoiding the subject. On the other hand, while the matter of nuclear wastes is somewhat afield from our general topic, there is a connection that might be of interest.

The only danger even attributed to nuclear wastes is that of causing cancer in future generations that are too stupid not to bit into a glassified chunk of power-plant waste. As we shall see, there is a threshold below which - even for those future glass munchers - there is no fear of increased cancer risk. But even if there weren't such a threshold, there are a number of issues regarding nuclear wastes that have been ignored in the media's misreporting of the subject that you should know about.

• More than 95% of the long half-life "waste" in nuclear fuel is not waste at all, but uranium and plutonium that may be reprocessed into fresh fuel assemblies. Most other industrialized nations do just this, as our government promised the utilities, but the Carter administration reneged on the agreement. (More about this later.)
• Among the "wastes" that anti-nuclear activists are eager to bury are valuable medical radionuclides that are produced at high cost in specialty reactors. As in the case of the reprocessable fuel, the baby is being thrown out with the bath water.
• The most sensible way to eliminate the unusable wastes from reprocessed fuel (which about to about 1% of their volume) is to dilute it a few millionfold and pour it down the drain, or to dump it into ocean abysses where there is no biological activity. Man's puny efforts at creating radionuclide wastes are dwarfed by the enormous amounts existing in nature. There are, for example, 36 billion curies of rubidium 87 and 380 billion curies of potassium 40 in the oceans, almost all of which will still be there when the few million curies of man's wastes have long since decayed to undetectable amounts. 

Why then, you may ask, are there hundreds or thousands of government- (read "taxpayer-") supported scientists busy writing reports on Yucca Mountain? I suggest there may be three reasons: (1) they don't know - or, more than likely, don't care - that low-level radiation is not harmful; (2) it beats having to get a real job; or (3) grants to study the mating habits of the Zambian sweat bee have already been taken.